Asset securitizations increase audit complexity and audit risks, which are expected to increase audit effort. We predict auditors became more sensitive to banks' asset securitization risks in light of their role in bank failures and the financial downturn that commenced in 2007. Using bank holding company data from 2003 to 2009, we find that asset securitization risks (retained interests) are associated with bank audit fees during, but not before, the global financial crisis. This suggests auditors were previously less attentive to securitization risks before the GFC. The results are consistent with auditors previously treating securitizations as asset sales rather than recourse debt.
Introduction
Auditors have been criticized in relation to disclosure issues concerning asset securitizations in the form of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. During the emergence of the sub-prime mortgage through [2003] [2004] [2005] We suggest that the characteristics of asset securitizations and flexible accounting rules were particularly challenging for auditors during the onset of the financial crisis. The complexity of asset securitizations and management's flexibility to choose whether to account for securitization as asset sales or borrowings (Kane 1997; Shipper and Yohn 2007) make it difficult for auditors to understand the true economic substance of the instruments, the financial risk status of the originating bank, and the discretionary earnings and capital management opportunities created by securitization transactions (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Karaoglu 2005) . The challenges and auditors' limitations in this regard also affect auditors' risk considerations in audit planning and pricing (Houston et al. 1999; Phillips 1999; Beaulieu 2001) . If auditors are focused on maintaining audit quality or an acceptable level of audit risk, higher securitization risk should induce increased audit effort, which will usually result in higher audit fees. 3 This allows us to use the established methods of audit fee studies to investigate whether auditors respond to differences in risks arising from asset securitizations, and whether auditor behavior in this regard has varied as a result of the global financial crisis. 4 The model we use for this purpose 3
Alternatively, self-interested auditors who recognize their risk exposure but are constrained from increasing effort may price-protect themselves by charging an audit fee premium, also resulting in higher audit fees.
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The analysis of audit fees is a basic tool in research into the audit market and auditors' behavior. Extant studies extensively investigate cross-sectional determination and inter-temporal variation in audit fees for indications of variation in audit effort and fee premia (Simunic 1980 (Simunic , 1984 Palmrose 1986; Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Pratt and Stice 1994; Craswell et al. 1995) . However, most such studies specifically exclude financial institutions from their analyses because of the attendant accounting and risk differences compared to other sectors. Consequently, there is relatively little research on audit effort and pricing in the banking industry.
is consistent with that used in Fields et al. (2004) to examine audit fee differences in relation to bank characteristics, which we extend to include asset securitization risks reflected in the amount of securitized assets and the amount of retained interests (Barth et al. 2011 ).
This approach is consistent with the view that audit risk in asset securitizations associated with transaction complexity, sale or borrowing accounting choice flexibility, and the risk of earnings or capital manipulations by management, is represented in the amount of securitized assets (Kane 1997; Matsumoto 2002; Minton et al. 2004; Karaoglu 2005; Shipper and Yohn 2007; Landsman et al. 2008 ).
Significant recourse against the originator of securitized assets is represented in retained interests, which is also sensitive to the reliability of fair value estimation conditioned on the economic environment (Barth et al. 2011 ).
Using publicly available data on U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 2003 to 2009 (after which time accounting regulations changed with the issuance of FAS 166 and FAS 167), we find that audit fees are not influenced by asset securitization amounts or retained interests prior to the GFC, but audit fees increase with retained interests (RI) in the post-GFC period. This suggests that auditors did not recognize the risk of asset securitizations prior to the GFC.
Asset securitizations are economically significant and an important sources of audit risk, as revealed by the current financial crisis and bank failures. Therefore, the evidence in this study concerning the changed relevance of asset securitizations to audit effort is an important contribution to the established literature concerned with auditor behavior. The study also contributes to the emerging literature on bank audits, which is a growing area of policy interest since Basel (2008) called for "more research on bank audits, especially in areas that are of particular interest to bank regulators and important to financial markets".
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in Section 2 and hypotheses are developed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the research design and Section 5 reports the main results. Robustness tests and further testing are reported in Section 6 and Section 7. Section 8 concludes the study.
Background

Asset securitizations
A bank's asset securitization transaction begins with the bank selling its cash flow rights from a pool of financial assets, such as mortgages and loans, to a special purpose entity (SPE) which is usually organized as a qualifying special purpose entity (QSPE) to avoid consolidation in the bank's accounts. The loans are then securitized by the QSPE in ranked tranches. In the absence of credit enhancements, the most junior securities tranche is the first to bear any default losses arising from the securitized assets. When the first tranche is exhausted, the losses pass to the second junior tranche, and so on until all losses are absorbed. Credit enhancements can insulate senior securities from the default risk on the underlying financial assets.
Enhancements are provided by the originators, or a third-party guarantor, in the form of cash collateral accounts, reserve funds, commitments to (re)purchase assets in default, credit derivatives, or recourse provisions. Rating agencies are involved in this step to assign ratings to the tranches. The securitization strategy is usually to maximize the size of the most senior tranche while still obtaining a AAA rating, and to leave the first (most junior) unrated and as small as possible while still allowing the second tranche to obtain an investment grade rating (Ryan 2008) . The most junior tranche(s) is often retained by the SPE and the investment-grade tranches are sold to investors. 5 Proceeds from investors fund the SPE's purchase of the cash flow rights from the bank. The SPE distributes the future cash flows generated by the underlying securitized financial assets to the investors, as specified in the security.
Accounting choices
The main accounting choice in relation to the securitization of financial assets is whether the initial transfer to the SPE is a sale or borrowing. qualify as an asset sale, the transferor must transfer the financial assets to a bankruptcy-remote entity and surrender controls of the transferred assets. To avoid being included in the bank's consolidated financial report, the entity must be a QSPE satisfying the conditions specified in FIN 46(R) or otherwise independent of the bank.
If the asset transfer qualifies as a sale, the illiquid loans are written back and the bank recognizes any retained interests and servicing assets on its balance sheet; unrealized future cash flows are treated as a gains or loss in the current income statement.
The economic substance of asset securitizations
Before the reformation of securitization accounting rules, resulting in FAS 166
and FAS 167, the general view of asset securitization from standard setters and regulators was as a sale with the appropriate transfer of risks (FAS 140; FIN 46R).
Although rating agencies state that they treat asset securitization as a secured borrowing before and after the sub-prime crisis (e.g., S&P Corporate Rating Criteria 2001 , 2008 , empirical evidence suggests that, in practice, the rating agencies treated asset securitization as an asset sale (Cheng and Neamtiu 2009; Barth et al. 2011) . In contrast the capital market appears to endow securitization with incomplete transfers of control and risk and treat it as a secured borrowing in relation to its risk and value relevance (Kane 1997; Ryan 1997; Treacy and Carey 1998; Niu and Richardson 2006; Shipper and Yohn 2007; Hansel and Krahnen 2007; Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011) .
fair value measurement to servicing assets in FAS 156 limitedly affects our study as servicing assets are not the focus of this study and only represent a small portion of retained interests. Effective from November 2009, FAS 166 and FAS 167 largely limit the scope of accounting for asset securitization as sales since 2010.
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As shown in Appendix 1.
A fundamental aspect of the extent and nature of risk transfers in banks' asset securitizations is the extent of any explicit or implicit recourse that endowed the bank with residual risks in addition to their retained interests. (Schwarcz 2004; Ryan 2007) and Barth et al. (2003) report that complexity and flexibility in security structuring and accounting treatments lead to information uncertainty and asymmetry.
Hypotheses Development
It appears that financial markets view asset securitizations, on average, as borrowings with the risk retained by the originator, especially under unfavorable market conditions (Kane 1997; Ryan 1997; Treacy and Carey 1998; Niu and Richardson 2006; Shipper and Yohn 2007; Hansel and Krahnen 2007; Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011) . If auditors are sensitive to market participants' attitudes towards asset securitizations, their audit risk assessment will emphasize the clients' levels of asset securitization, especially under unfavorable situations. We develop hypotheses that relate auditor risk to each of total asset securitizations and retained interests, and how the relations might vary with changing market conditions.
The purpose of an audit is to reduce information risk by providing assurance that an entity's financial report is free from material omissions or misstatements. We assume that, in keeping with professional standards, auditors seek to reduce audit risk
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Before the sub-prime crisis, it was argued that securitization could reduce information uncertainty. The grounds for this included: (1) securitization requires disclosure of more information than non-securitized assets (Foley et al. 1999; Schwarcz 2004) ; The increased transparency with regard to the underlying loans mitigates information asymmetry; (2) rating agencies published ratings on securities periodically and provide 3rd party monitoring on securitized assets; and (3) the underlying assets are subject to stricter disclosure requirements under securitization (Foley et al. 1999 
The level of securitized assets and audit fees
The general expectation of increased inherent risk assessments leading to increased auditor effort is consistent with the extant auditing literature. There is substantial evidence in prior studies that client complexity, crudely proxied by measures based on organizational structure, asset structure and industry diversity, is positively associated with audit effort or fees (Hay et al. 2006 ). Evidence of the positive impact of the risk of earnings management or aggressive financial reporting on audit planning and pricing is reported in experimental studies (Houston et al. 1999; Phillips 1999; Beaulieu 2001) and archival research (Gul et al. 2003; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Lyon and Maher 2005) .
Given the transactional complexity of securitizations, the extent of the accounting discretion available during our study period, and the incentives for banks to maintain financial performance and capital levels, we argue that auditors will initially assess inherent risk as high, and then will have to examine aspects of a bank's asset securitizations to establish the appropriateness of accounting treatments irrespective of risks attached to retained interests. This implies that audit effort will vary in relation to clients' levels of asset securitization, holding other factors constant. interests represent the components that bear the first risk of losses on the securitized asset, which are designed to be sufficient enough to cover reasonably expected credit risks attached to the underlying assets. If auditors accept that an asset securitization is a sale of assets, their audit risk consideration in relation to asset securitization is restricted to the components of retained interests. If auditors form the view that a securitization has the characteristics of borrowing, In this case, a positive association between audit fees and total securitized assets rather than audit fees and retained interests is expected. Therefore, we make a directional prediction on the association between audit fees and retained interests:
H2: Audit fees are positively associated with the amount of retained interests.
Two other issues may also affect auditors' risk assessment of the information provided by retained interests. First, the value of retained interests is based on the fair value estimate of the securitization components (FAS 140; FAS 157). Due to the lack of a market consensus price, the fair value estimate of the components usually relies on certain subjective assumptions of default rates, prepayment rates and discount rates (FAS 157). Therefore, the reliability of fair value estimation is sensitive to the economic environment and is also subject to management manipulation (Dechow et al. 2009 ). Second, empirical research finds evidence on the existence of implicit recourse to subsidize SPE investors for any default losses related to the transferred assets (Higgins and Mason 2004; Calomiris and Mason 2004; Chen et al. 2008; Gorton and Souleles 2005) . It implies that the actual guarantee provided by the originator is not limited to the extent of retained interests, but covers the overall credit risk of the underlying assets limited to the total amount of securitized assets in case of economic difficulties. If this is the case, although retained interests represent the explicit recourse of originators to investors, due to their subjective fair value estimates and the existence of implicit recourse, the retained interests should be no more important than other components in judging the true risk association between the originator and the securitized assets for auditors. Asset securitizations have been identified as significant contributors to the financial crisis. We investigate if auditors' response to asset securitization factors changed after the onset of the GFC. For an auditor, constraints on the availability of capital and credit, going concern and liquidity issues, the discretion and complexity in SPEs and other complex financing arrangements, and significant estimation and valuation uncertainty in a deteriorating market contribute to the auditor's appraisal of audit risk for a client in the financial market. Irrespective of their behavior in relation to asset securitizations prior to the downturn, we expect that auditors would pay more attention to asset securitization risks from 2007, resulting in a stronger relationship audit fees and asset securitization, compared to before the GFC:
Auditor behavior with the global financial crisis
H3a: There is a stronger positive association between audit fees and securitized assets after the onset of the GFC compared to before the GFC.
H3b: There is a stronger positive association between audit fees and retained interests after the onset of the GFC compared to before the GFC.
Asset securitization risks could be represented by the amount of securitized assets or by the amount of the retained interests, depending on auditors' analysis of the economic substance of the asset securitizations.
The impact of asset securitizations on audit pricing to credit risks
Fields et al. (2004) suggest a positive association between audit fees and bank credit risks. Specifically, banks with higher level of commercial loans, mortgage loans and intangible assets are charged higher audit fees by auditors; banks with higher levels of problematic assets (proxied by the non-performing loan ratio and the chargeoff ratio) are charged higher audit fees by auditors.
Asset securitizations have the potential effect of understating observable credit risks by removing on-balance sheet financial assets from the balance sheet. We argue that the awareness of the risks embedded in asset securitizations should raise auditors'
concerns about auditees' on-balance sheet credit risks and result in more audit effort on credit risk evaluation and assurance, leading to higher audit fees.
H4a: As securitized assets increase, audit fees increase relative to credit risks.
H4b: As retained interests increase, audit fees increase relative to credit risks.
We measure the credit risks with asset structure proxies (commercial loan ratio, mortgage loan ratio) and problematic asset proxies (the non-performing loan ratio and the charge-off ratio). Asset securitization risks could be represented by the amount of securitized assets or by the amount of the retained interests, depending on auditors'
understanding of the economic substance and/or the extent of risk transfer of asset securitizations.
4 Research Design
Model
We test the hypotheses by using an adaptation of the audit fee model for financial Banks could use interest rate derivatives to hedge on-balance-sheet interest rate risks. Supposing that the only purpose that banks use interest rate derivatives is to hedge their on-balance-sheet interest rate risks, a higher proportion of interest rate derivatives lead to lower risks and, potentially, lower audit fees. However, the notional amount of the derivatives and the amount of the on-balance-sheet position hedged might not be the same. (Under the derivative mechanism, the derivative amount is affected by both the amount of the hedged position and the date to maturity of the derivative and the hedged position.) While the relation between INTDERIV and on-balancesheet interest rate risks is not clear, we argue it is a good proxy for off-balance-sheet risk.
and Shakespeare 2009). 
Data Source and Criteria
Consistent
Sample
We restrict our sample to BHCs. First, for firms performing securitization activities, BHCs represent a relatively large and economically important sample (Barth et al. 2011) . Niu and Richardson (2006) indicate the intensity of securitization related transactions in the traditional financial sector is stronger than in other sectors.
Dechow et al. (2009) 
Descriptive Statistics 14
Means of variables are presented in Table 1, total assets values are all much lower in Non-Big N audits than in Big N audits.
There is a sharp increase in the proportion of BHCs experiencing a loss duringthe GFC. Correspondingly, with the consideration that the asset composition is generally stable during the period (e.g. TRANSACCT, COMMLOAN, MTGLOAN etc.), asset quality experiences an unfavorable change duringthe GFC, as reflected in the deterioration of non-performing loan ratios (NONPERFORM) and the charge-off ratios (CHGOFF). On average, securitizers appear to have lower asset quality (CHGOFF and NONPERFORM) and have higher on-balance-sheet and off-balancesheet interest rate sensitivity.
The sample is highly right-skewed with mean values more than 10 times larger than the median values for the pooled data and the yearly data. This distribution is We winsorize all continuous control variables at their 1 and 99 percentiles. . <Table 2>
<Table 1>
Correlations
Results
We report the regression results for pooled data based on clustered standard errors (clustered on BHCs) and control the year effects.
The Validity of Modified BHC Audit Fee Model
As a reliability test, we first estimate the Fields et al. (2004) model, which does not consider securitizations, using our pooled sample. As reported in Table 3 16 SENSITIVE*∆INT is significant in the model when there is no controls on year fixed effects.
<Table 3>
Audit Fees and Asset Securitizations
To test H1 and H2, we add SARATIO and RIRATIO with the control variable GOSRATIO to our modified Model 1. To test H3, we then, add the time-period indicator PGFC and the interaction terms SARATIO*PGFC and RIRATIO*PGFC into the model. The results are reported in Table 4 . For efficiency, we report the coefficients for the new variables only. SARATIO and RIRATIO are significantly correlated (see Table 3 ).Therefore, we also estimate the model for the pooled sample with only one of SARATIO, RIRATIO, SARATIO*PGFC or RIRATIO*PGFC (Table 4 Panel B). Both SARATIO and RIRATIO are positively significant, indicating some substitution effect. However, SARATIO*PGFC remains negative while RIRATIO*PGFC remains positive.
<Table 4>
The Impact of Asset Securitizations on Audit Fees relative to Credit Risks
We report the effects of asset securitizations on audit fees, relative to credit risk factors, in Table 5 . We use the ratio of commercial loans (COMMLOAN) and mortgage loans (MTGLOAN) to proxy for the credit risks pertaining to asset structure and the non-performing loan ratio (NONPERFORM) and charge-off ratio (CHGOFF)
as proxies for credit risks pertaining to asset quality. These are interacted with our securitization variables SARATIO and RIRATIO, and the period indicator PGFC.
There is some indication that asset securitizations affect the association between the asset structure measures and audit fees. The interactions of asset structural credit risk measures with PGFC suggest that auditors marginally increase their audit fees in response to commercial loans and mortgage assets when the BHC shows a higher proportion of retained interests. Controlling for CHGOFF results in a positive coefficient for SARATIO, indicating further analysis is needed.
<Table 5>
6 Robustness Tests 
Matched Pair Sample and Securitizer Only Sample
CAMELS Audit Fee Model Results
We have concern that Model (1) is over-modeled with 16 control variables. In response, we establish Model (2) 
Controlling for Changes in Macroeconomic Conditions, Auditor change and Auditor Independence, Investment in MBS and ABS
We want to clarify if the audit fee determination changes with the macroeconomic conditions other than the GFC. Therefore, we control for changes in the 
Additional Analyses
Big N Auditors and Industry Specialists
The main tests suggest that auditor type is an important factor affecting audit The results suggest that PWC and KPMG do not charge higher audit fees than the other two Big N auditors. Due to serious multicollinearity, it is hard to interpret the difference of individual Big 4 auditors' pricing to asset securitization factors.
<Table 7>
Large BHCs
We are particularly interested in the large BHCs as asset securitizations are clustered in large BHCs. Large BHCs have higher audit fees and more asset securitization activities, are more likely to employ Big N auditors, incur a loss, and have a higher charge-off rate, a higher intangible asset ratio and a higher interestsensitive asset ratio than small BHCs. Dividing the pooled sample into small BHC and large BHC subsamples from the median total assets, Our results address the question that "where were the auditors in asset securitizations" under the lens of audit pricing. It suggests that auditors focused on the risks associated with the retained portion of the securitized assets in their audits, rather than securitization levels, especially during the GFC. This is consistent with auditors treating asset securitizations as sales, even though bank failures during the GFC demonstrate that it might be wiser to treat them as secured borrowings.
We also find that off-balance-sheet risks audit effort, as reflected in audit fees;
and the macroeconomic condition and non-audit service fees are important determinants of audit fees. By comparing the audit pricing to asset securitization risks for BHCs audited by Big N and non-Big N auditors, we obtain inconclusive signals that Big N auditors are better at pricing asset securitization risks than non-Big N auditors.
This study contributes to the limitedly developed bank audit literature. It provides insights on auditors' responses to the financial crisis, particularly with regard to asset securitizations. The relatively stable regulatory and accounting standard environment during the study period enhances our study as a test of auditor behavior in relation to a deteriorating economic environment. By addressing bank audits and asset securitizations, we consider several issues identified in Basel (2008) regarding consolidation, fair value estimation and disclosures of off-balance-sheet vehicles.
The limitations of our study include the following. First, due to the data availability, our study only covers 4 years pre-GFC data and 3 years of GFC data.
This might not be sufficient to capture auditors' learning and responses to securitization issues. Second, this study only analyses the cost-side of the association between audit pricing and asset securitization. Reporting quality and audit quality in securitization audit is pending further research. 1. Satterthwaite t test is used. This is an alternative to the pooled-variance t test and is used when the assumption that the two populations have equal variances seems unreasonable. It provides a t statistic that asymptotically (that is, as the sample sizes become large) approaches a t distribution, allowing for an approximate t test to be calculated when the population variances are not equal. 
